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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
PRINCIPAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In State v. McAllister' David Rachal and Christopher McAllister
were jointly indicted and tried for first degree murder. Rachal was
convicted of manslaughter, but the jury was unable to reach a ver-
dict as to McAllister. Following the mistrial, McAllister moved to
quash the indictment, contending that the manslaughter conviction
of Rachal, the "actual perpetrator of the homicide,"' barred a subse-
quent prosecution of him for a greater degree of homicide.
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this reasoning; the mere
fact that the jury had found that Rachal had acted in a heat of pas-
sion did not preclude the state from charging that McAllister had
acted without the "mitigating element" of "passion." The court was
very explicit in announcing the broad principle that "one who aids
and abets in the commission of a crime may be charged and con-
victed with a higher or lower degree of crime depending on the men-
tal element proved at trial."'
The court's rationale is both logical and sound: two persons can
act jointly with differing states of mind. The McAllister approach
clearly recognizes this distinction.
DANGEROUS WEAPON - ARMED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BATTERY
A state of confusion has existed since the supreme court in
State v. Johnston" and State v. Levi5 indicated that the response of
the victim could be considered in determining whether the manner
of use of an object created a risk of harm. Under the Criminal
Code's definition of "dangerous weapon," the focus in each case
must be on the manner of use of the instrumdntality rather than on
its inherently dangerous charactristics' Thus, a thing not designed
to inflict harm can become a "dangerous weapon" due to the manner
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 366 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1978).
2. Id. at 1342.
3. Id. at 1343.
4. 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1944).
5. 259 La. 591, 250 So. 2d 751 (1971).
6. LA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950) provides: ."Dangerous weapon' includes any gas, liquid
or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely
to produce death or great bodily harm." (Emphasis added.)
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in which it is used. Under the Johnston-Levi theory, a reasonable
argument can be made that objects incapable of inflicting injury,
such as a toy gun, can nevertheless be used to create highly charged
atmospheres in which the danger comes from the victim's potential
reaction, and not from harms the offender could inflict with the in-
strumentality itself.
Under this potential reaction theory, the "dangerousness" ap-
pears to depend more on the victim's reasonable, subjective belief
that the offender is armed rather than on the nature of the in-
strumentality itself. The supreme court has recognized that this
may lead to an unduly expansive notion of the term "dangerous
weapon," particularly in armed robbery cases.
The supreme court took the opportunity in State v. Bonier7 to
discuss the problem created by jurisprudential efforts to clarify the
relationship between "dangerous weapon" and the victim's potential
reaction. The court maintained that the test of dangerousness does
not lie "exclusively in the subjective characterization by the victim
of whether he is in danger."' Although recognizing that the victim's
violent reaction is a factor from which the jury can find "an actual
likely danger of serious bodily harm," the court emphasized that the
"actual likelihood of danger," and not merely the victim's "subjec-
tive reaction," is critical.' Although Bonier has not completely
resolved the problem, the court has recognized the conceptual dif-
ficulties and has at least attempted to clarify one point: the victim's
subjective belief is not the sole factor to consider in determining
whether the instrumentality is a dangerous weapon.
It is submitted that the court should consider the relationship in
armed robbery cases between the term "armed" and the term
"dangerous weapon." The court could logically take the position
that, by use of the term "armed," the legislature intended to impose
the more severe penalty attached to armed (as opposed to simple)
robbery only when the instrumentality is itself capable of inflicting
harm. The term "armed" connotes the availability of some instru-
ment capable of inflicting harm.
In State v. Legendre10 the supreme court quashed an indictment
which charged that the accused committed aggravated battery by
using a concrete parking lot to inflict injury on the victim; apparent-
ly, the defendant had forcibly thrown the victim against the con-
crete. The court refused to allow the prosecution to support its
7. 367 So. 2d 824 (La. 1979).
8. Id. at 826.
9. Id. at 826-27.
10. 362 So. 2d 570 (La. 1978).
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charge on the theory that such an action constituted "use" 11 of the
concrete parking lot in a manner calculated or likely to cause death
or great bodily harm. Certainly, an aggravated battery charge
would lie had the defendant picked up a piece of concrete from the
lot and struck the victim. However, had the court adopted the
state's theory in Legendre, the crime of aggravated battery would
have been given an expansive interpretation not contemplated by
the legislature. The concept of "use" of the instrumentality in ag-
gravated battery should be restricted to situations in which the ac-
cused takes physical control of an object and moves it to batter the
victim-as opposed to situations in which the defendant takes
physical control of the victim and hurls him against the object.
DIMINISHED CAPACITY
In State v. Lecompte," the supreme court, in a very concise opi-
nion by Justice Blanche,"3 rejected the defense's contention that
evidence of mental conditions not constituting "insanity," as defined
in Criminal Code article 14, was admissible to reduce the grade of
the offense by defeating specific intent or special knowledge.'
Justice Blanche expressed concern that, should "diminished capaci-
ty" be accepted as a defense, it would facilitate the introduction of
psychiatric or other expert opinion evidence on the question of in-
tent. He preferred to accept only traditionally admissible evidence
on the issue of intent and to leave the question to the sound judg-
ment of a jury "unaided by the advice of others."'5
Justice Tate, in a concurring opinion, argued for the introduc-
tion of the diminished capacity defense in Louisiana. In State v.
Jones," decided almost exactly one year prior to Lecompte, Justice
Tate noted that Louisiana was in the minority in rejecting the
defense, but that the supreme court was "not willing .. .to recon-
sider Louisiana's jurisprudential rule."'7
The legislature's express statement in article 14, i.e., restricting
the insanity defense to cases in which the defendant lacks the abili-
11. LA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950). See note 6, supra.
12. 371 So. 2d 239 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
13. Former Chief Justice Sanders had authored the opinion on original hearing.
After rehearing was granted, the Chief Justice retired and the remaining members of
the court were evenly divided on the issue. Justice Blanche, the new member of the
court, adopted Chief Justice Sanders' views.
14. LA. R.S. 14:14 (1950) provides: "If the circumstances indicate that because of a
mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be ex-
empt from criminal responsibility."
15. 371 So. 2d at 245.
16. 359 So. 2d 95 (La. 1978).
17. Id. at 98.
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ty to distinguish right from wrong, strongly supports the majority's
view in Lecompte. Although the prosecution must prove specific in-
tent or special knowledge in some crimes, the supreme court is un-
willing to permit juries to consider evidence of mental disease or
defect short of the "M'Naughten" standard 8 for the purpose of prov-
ing or disproving such intent or knowledge. Only the traditional
modes of proof can be utilized to establish the existence vel non of
specific intent or special knowledge; the testimony of psychiatrists
or psychologists concerning the defendant's peculiar mental condi
tion is inadmissible in this regard.
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY-RECEIPT BY OWNER'S AGENT
The supreme court held in State v. Nguyen" that the legislature
did not intend to penalize a person who knowingly received stolen
property if he received the property as an agent of the owner with
an intent to restore it to its owner. The court reasoned that when
stolen property is received by one who is acting as the owner's
agent, it loses its "stolen nature."20
It remains unclear, however, whether the supreme court will
treat the agency relationship as an affirmative defense or will re-
quire the state to prove that the receiver acted with an intent to
deprive the owner of his property."' In resolving this dilemma, it
seems apparent that the court could follow either of two lines of
analysis. One approach is to consider that, once the state proves
that a person knowingly received stolen property, the burden shifts
to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he
was acting as agent of the owner and intended to restore the pro-
perty. Another would be to hold that, should the defense be
"raised," '' the state must bear the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with a corrupt intent,
that is, with an intent to deprive the owner of his property.
The writer feels that the matter should be treated as an affir-
mative defense in the nature of justification. Even though the letter
of the statute may have been violated, one who received stolen
18. See note 14, supra.
19. 367 So. 2d 342 (La. 1979).
20. Id. at 344-45.
21. The court in Nguyen specifically noted that it need not decide whether receiv-
ing stolen property requires proof that the receiver acted with an intent to deprive
the owner of his property. Id. at 345.
22. The writer does not know exactly how one "raises" defenses. However, this
does not seem to be a problem. For example, if self-defense is raised, the state must
prove that the accused did not act in self-defense. See State v. Patterson, 295 So. 2d
792 (La. 1974).
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goods in order to return them to the owner is certainly justified in
acting as he did.
SIMPLE ESCAPE-DEFENSE OF MEDICAL NECESSITY
In State v. Boleyn' the supreme court recognized the defense of
"necessity for escape" when an inmate is faced with a specific and
imminent threat of forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily harm.
This jurisprudentially created defense differs from the Criminal
Code's defense of compulsion primarily in the degree of immediacy
required. Compulsion requires a showing that the defendant feared
that the threat of harm would immediately be carried out. Such is
not the case, however, for the defense of necessity of escape.
The supreme court in State v. Jacobs' also indicated a favorable
attitude toward a defense of medical necessity in escape cases.' In
order to establish this affirmative defense," the prisoner must prove
the following:
(1) The prison officials were made aware of his medical condi-
tion but nevertheless denied him treatment.
23. 328 So. 2d 95 (La. 1976).
24. 371 So. 2d 801 (La. 1979).
25. Id at 802. The defendant's conviction was affirmed, however, because he failed
to establish the "minimum conditions" necessary to raise the defense.
The Lousiana Supreme Court quoted with approval the following guidelines
adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Worley, 265 S.C. 551, 220
S.E.2d 242 (1975):
There possibily may be situations when a prisoner's dilemma is so serious
an escape could be justified. If a prisoner is in need of emergency medical treat-
ment to avoid death or immediate, serious permanent bodily injury, he may have
a defense of necessity submitted to the jury. Certain minimum conditions are set
forth as guidelines which must be satisfied before this defense is available.
(1) The prisoner must have informed prison officials of the condition, in
writing, unless admitted by the prison officials, and have been denied professional
medical care;
(2) There must not be time to resort to the courts;
(3) The escape must be without use or threat of use of force;
(4) The escapee must promptly seek professional medical treatment;
(5) The treating physician, or if he is unavailable, a physician responding to a
hypothetical question, must testify the prisoner was actually in danger of death
or immediate serious permanent bodily injury unless the prisoner was given prompt
professional medical treatment;
(6) After seeing the physician, the prisoner must immediately surrender
himself to the authorities.
Id at 554-55, 220 S.E.2d at 243.
26. Although not specifically discussed, the issue of burden of proof seems to rest
with the defendant to establish the conditions necessary to assert the defense. As with
other affirmative defenses, the accused must prove his contentions by a preponderance
of evidence. For the defense of compulsion in the Criminal Code, see LA. R.S. 14:18(6)
(1950).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
(2) After his non-forcible escape, he immediately resorted to
medical treatment and surrendered to the authorities im-
mediately afterwards.
(3) The threat to his health was so great that he was without
time to resort to the courts.
In the writer's view, it would be unreasonable to expect a
prisoner not to escape under the conditions required to establish the
defense. Although the Code's defense of compulsion would be
unavailable in this situation, the legislature obviously did not intend
to penalize such offenders. The significance of Boleyn and Jacobs
lies in the willingness of the court to create affirmative "necessity"
defenses not contemplated by the general article on justification in
the Louisiana Criminal Code.
FIRST DEGREE MURDER-"IMPLIED AMENDMENT"
In 1976, in response to the United States Supreme Court's opi-
nions in Gregg v. Georgia7 and related cases, Louisiana adopted a
bifurcated trial scheme for first degree murder. 8 The legislature
had previously mandated the death penalty for all killings commit-
ted with the specific intent under certain aggravating cir-
cumstances, such as during the commission of an armed robbery."
The aggravating circumstances were elements of the mandatory
death penalty offense of first degree murder, and not merely senten-
cing considerations.
The 1976 amendments removed the aggravating factors as
elements of the offense. First degree murder was defined as "the
27. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
28. 1976 La. Acts. No. 694, adding LA. CODE CalM. P. arts. 905-05.9.
29. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1973) (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 657).
The 1973 version of article 30 provided:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily
harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of
his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a
life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person;
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been of-
fered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death.
[Vol. 40
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killing of a human being when the offender [acted with] a specific in-
tent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."3 The various ag-
gravating circumstances previously found in the definition of the
crime were now to be considered by the jury during the penalty
phase.31
The result of the amendments was to include all specific intent
killings within the category of first degree murder. Additionally, all
specific intent killings had to be handled as capital cases, with the
attendant procedural complexities, 2 despite the absence of any ag-
gravating circumstance justifying the death penalty.3
In 1977, the legislature amended the second degree murder
statute to include specific intent killings committed without ag-
gravating circumstances.3 Confusion immediately resulted, for first
30. 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1973). The 1976 version
of article 30 provided:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a
specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death
or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspen-
sion of sentence in accordance with the recommendation of the jury.
31. LA. CODE. CRIM. P. art. 905.4, added by 1976 La. Acts, No. 694. This article
was amended by Act 74 of 1979. See note 103, infra. The 1976 version of article 905.4
provided:
The following shall be considered aggravating circumstances:
(a) The offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, or armed robbery;
(b) The victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties;
(c) The offender was previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated
rape, or aggravated kidnapping;
(d) The offender knowingly created a risk of.death or great bodily harm to
more than one person;
(e) The offender offered or has been offered or has given or received anything
of value for the commission of the offense;
(f) The offender at the time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned
after sentence for the commission of an unrelated forcible felony;
(g) The offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner.
32. E.g., mandatory sequestration of jurors, LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 791, and a
unanimous verdict, LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782.
33. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.4. For the text of this article, see note 31,
supra. For the 1979 amendment to article 905.4, see note 103, infra.
34. 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976).
The 1977 version of article 30.1 provided:
Second degree murder is:
A. The killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetra-
tion or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple
robbery, even though he has no intent to kill; or
B. The killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill,
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degree murder was also a specific intent killing committed without
aggravating circumstances, since the presence or absence of ag-
gravating circumstances was a penalty issue.
In State v. Payton35 the Louisiana Supreme Court eliminated
this confusion by finding that the 1977 amendment to second degree
murder evinced a legislative intent to remove specific intent killings
committed without aggravating circumstances from the first degree
murder category. Under the court's "implied amendment" theory,
the state was required to prove the existence of an aggravating cir-
cumstance in its case in chief on the question of guilt or innocence.
Aggravating circumstances, therefore, once again became elements
of the offense, not merely penalty considerations.
The supreme court in Payton logically reached the conclusion
that several aggravating circumstances could not serve as elements
of first degree murder. The "heinous, atrocious or cruel" manner of
commission, properly a penalty consideration, was deemed too vague
to serve as an element of the offense. Additionally, the court found
that the accused's prior conviction for an unrelated murder or the
fact that he committed the offense while serving a sentence for an
unrelated forcible felony dealt with his character and not with the
manner in which he committed the killing. Therefore, neither of
these two aggravating circumstances could serve as an element of
first degree murder.
In 1978, almost immediately after the decision in Payton was an-
nounced, on recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
the legislature repealed the provision of the second degree murder
article which was the source of the "implied amendment" theory."
under circumstances that would be first degree murder under Article 30, but the
killing is accomplished without any of the aggravating circumstances listed in Ar-
ticle 905.4 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be imprisoned at
hard labor for life and shall not be eligible for parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence for a period of forty years.
35. 361 So. 2d 866 (La. 1978).
36. 1978 La. Acts, No. 796, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1977). Paragraph B of
the 1977 version of article 30.1, see note 34, supra, the provision precipitating the
Payton holding, was repealed by the 1978 legislature. The 1978 version of article 30.1
provided:
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, ag-
gravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape,
armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to in-
flict great bodily harm.
Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence
and shall not be eligible for parole for forty years.
[Vol. 40
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Thus, the Payton definition was applicable only for offenses commit-
ted from September 8, 1977, until September 7, 1978.1'
The definition of first degree murder, however, was still
unresolved. Apparently the Louisiana district attorneys favored the
result in Payton. During the 1979 legislative session, at the urging
of the prosecutors, the definitions of first and second degree murder
were amended to reflect the status of the law under Payton.' Again
the state must prove an "aggravating circumstance" as an element
of the crime of first degree murder, not merely as a penalty con-
sideration at the sentencing trial. Although the aggravating
elements of the offense are not quite the same as the aggravating
penalty considerations of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they are
similar. Significantly, as under the 1977 amendment as interpreted
by Payton, the 1979 amendment allows the state to prosecute an
"unaggravated" specific intent murder as a second degree murder.
The special procedural aspects of capital cases, such as mandatory
sequestration of the jury and a unanimous verdict, will not be re-
quired in such noncapital murders."
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
In State v. Chrisman° the supreme court held that the Louisiana
37. See State v. Perkins, 375 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1979).
38. 1979 La. Acts. No. 74, amending LA. R.S. 14:30-30.1 (Supp. 1978). LA. R.S.
14:30 (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kid-
napping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, aggravated
burglary, armed robbery, or simply robbery;
(2) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon a fireman or peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful
duties;
(3) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person; or
(4) when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and
has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the
killing.
LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1979) provides in pertinent part:
(1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm; or
(2) when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetra-
tion of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kid-
napping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he
has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
39. Compare LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1973), see note 29, supra, with LA. R.S. 14;30
(Supp. 1979), see note 38, supra.
40. 364 So. 2d 906 (La. 1978).
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constitutional right to privacy in one's own home' is not violated by
prohibitions against the home possession of marijuana for personal
use. The supreme court found that the defendant failed to carry his
burden of establishing that the legislature had no reasonable basis
for enacting prohibitions against marijuana to protect public health,
safety, and welfare.
ATTEMPTED INCITING TO RIOT-
ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT INCHOATE OFFENSES
The supreme court in State v. Eames'2 reversed the defendant's
conviction for attempting to incite a riot. Finding that inciting to
riot is an inchoate offense like attempt and conspiracy, the court, in
an opinion authored by Justice Dixon, held that there could be no at-
tempt to commit such an offense. Justice Dixon relied on an earlier
unreported case, State ex rel Duhon v. General Manager, Louisiana
State Penitentiary,3 in which the supreme court approved without
discussion the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner con-
victed of attempted conspiracy.
The view that there can be no attempt to commit an inchoate of-
fense is eminently valid. Justice Dixon's approach was sound in that
he examined the nature of the offense in determining whether it
was an inchoate one. However, -inciting to riot can be committed by
endeavoring to have others riot as well as by participating in a riot.
Participation should not be considered an inchoate offense. In a
dissenting opinion in Eames, former Chief Justice Sanders argued
that the defendant was properly convicted of attempting to par-
ticipate in a riot. Although attempted incitement to riot should be
properly viewed as an inchoate offense, the writer shares the
former Chief Justice's view that attempted participation should not.
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS BY FELONS
In 1975, the legislature enacted Criminal Code article 95.1, which
prohibits persons convicted of certain felonies from possessing
firearms." However, a convicted felon who has not been convicted of
41. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
42. 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978).
43. No. 39,091 (La. July 20, 1948). See Note, Criminal Law and Procedure-At-
tempt and Conspiracy Separate Inchoate Offenses-Relief by Habeas Corpus, 9 LA. L.
REV. 413 (1949).
44. 1975 La. Acts, No. 492, § 2, adding LA. R.S. 14:95.1. This article provides:
A. It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of first or second
degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated battery, aggravated or simple rape, ag-
gravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated or simple burglary, armed or
simple robbery, or any violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances
[Vol. 40
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another felony for ten years following his discharge from his
sentence is not affected by this statute. Additionally, felons may
also apply to the sheriff of their parish of residence for permission
to possess firearms.
In State v. Williams"' the supreme court had an opportunity to
decide whether the ten-year "cleansing period" was an affirmative
defense to be proven by the accused. Although not required to reach
the issue, the court emphasized that the state bears the burden of
proving that the ten-year period had not lapsed, in effect treating
the time period as an element of the offense. The court's decision
was based on the "comparative ease" with which the state can prove
that the defendant's possession fell within the ten-year period. The
court recognized the "easy access" the district attorney had to such
information and the difficulty faced by the defendant in seeking to
prove a negative; it was also speculated that the defendant may
have difficulty obtaining documentation from other jurisdictions and
thus might be forced to testify in order to establish the convic-
tionless ten-year period.
While the court's result in Williams is certainly fair, the writer
feels that the court has not properly assessed the burden of proof in
Law which is a felony or any crime defined as an attempt to commit one of the
above enumerated offenses under the laws of this state, or who has been con-
victed under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign
government or country of a crime which if committed in this state, would be one
of the above enumerated crimes, to possess a firearm or carry a concealed
weapon.
B. Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than three nor more than ten years. If such
conviction is for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, such sentence shall be
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined
not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.
C. Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Section shall not apply to
the following cases:
(1) The provisions of this Section prohibiting the possession of firearms and car-
rying concealed weapons by persons who have been convicted of certain felonies
shall not apply to any person who has not been convicted of any felony for a
period of ten years from the date of completion of sentence, probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence.
(2) Upon completion of sentence, probation, parole, or suspension of sentence the
convicted felon shall have the right to apply to the sheriff of the parish in which
he resides, or in the case of Orleans Parish the superintendent of police, for a per-
mit to possess firearms. The felon shall be entitled to possess the firearm upon
the issuing of the permit.
(3) The sheriff or superintendent of police, as the case may be, shall immediately
notify the Department of Public Safety, in writing, of the issuance of each permit
granted under this section.
45. 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978).
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accordance with the legislative intent. This exception to the firearm
possession statute was obviously designed as an affirmative defense
to be established by the accused.
It is interesting to note that in State v. Aguillard,"' decided
several months after Williams, the supreme court found that the
defendant had the burden of proving that he was authorized by per-
mit to possess a firearm. Again, the comparative ease of proof ap-
peared to have been the basis for the decision. Williams was neither
cited nor distinguished in Augillard. In both cases, the court was
consistent in achieving its result by allocating the burden of proof in
accordance with which party can most readily prove the matter at
issue, and not by determining whether the legislature really intend-
ed the "exceptions" to be elements of the offense or affirmative
defenses.
COMPULSORY PROCESS -
OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES
The right of the defendant to compulsory process is embodied in
both the state and federal constitutions. In State v. Hogan7 state
authorities failed to process timely the defendant's request for a
trial subpoena for an out-of-state witness. The witness, a proba-
tioner living in Virginia, was a participant in the narcotics transfer
for which the defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin.
Prior to the trial, the defendant secured a court order directing the
district attorney to reveal the witness's name and address. The
defendant then requested the issuance of an out-of-state witness sub-
poena based on the asserted need for the witness to testify to sup-
port the defense of entrapment. The Louisiana trial court issued its
certificate to the Virginia court in compliance with the Louisiana
and Virginia statutes.'8
When the defense counsel contacted the appropriate sheriff in
Virginia to inquire about service, he was informed that the cer-
tificate had not been received. Counsel then checked with the clerk
of the Louisiana trial court and was assured that the certificate had
been sent to the proper authorities. Contacting the Virginia
authorities once again, counsel was informed that the sheriff had
been in touch with the witness. On the day of trial, the material
witness from Virginia had not arrived; and the trial court refused to
grant a continuance.
46. 371 So. 2d 798 (La. 1979).
47. 372 So. 2d 1211 (La. 1979).
48. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 741; VA. CODE §§ 19.2-273 to -276 (1950).
[Vol. 40
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The supreme court had no difficulty in getting immediately to
the core of the matter. The fact that the trial had commenced prior
to the defense counsel's request for a delay did not control. The
court, citing State v. Mizell,'9 said that it would treat the defense
motion as one for a recess. Hence, the failure of the defendant to
comply with the formal requisites of the motion for a continuance
was not controlling.
The court determined that due diligence had been exercised by
the defendant and that the defendant showed that the witness pro-
bably would have appeared had the proper steps been taken. This,
according to the court's approach, shifted the burden to the state to
explain the failure of the authorities to properly serve the subpoena.
The effect of the decision is limited because the defense counsel
made a very strong showing of official failure. It would have been
unreasonable to hold the accused responsible for the lack of
diligence of the Louisiana or Virginia officials. It would have also
been unreasonable to require the defense counsel to show what ef-
forts the officials made to procure the witness. Given the
defendant's initial showing, the court wisely shifted the burden to
the district attorney to prove that the authorities acted with
reasonable diligence.
COMPULSORY PROCESS-DEFENSE WITNESS'S REFUSAL TO TESTIFY
In State v. Jones5" the supreme court held that the defendant's
right to compel the testimony' of witnesses in his behalf prevails
over the witnesses' asserted interest in self-preservation. Thus, the
trial court must sanction or threaten to sanction with contempt the
witnesses' non-privileged refusal to testify.
The witness in Jones was a co-offender who had previously pled
guilty. When called by the defense, the witness refused to testify
due to his asserted fear for his own safety in prison should he
testify. The refusal could not have been predicated on the privilege
against self-incrimination because, in conjunction with his guilty
plea, the prosecutor offered him immunity.
The supreme court reversed Jones' conviction because the trial
court refused to order the witness to testify. There was no showing
that the witness faced a real danger of reprisal for testifying as a
defense witness. However, this factor did not seem to be significant
to the court. Absent some "legally valid" excuse for permitting the
witness to refuse to testify, the supreme court adopted the view
49. 341 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976).
50. 363 So. 2d 455 (La. 1978).
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that the defendant had a right to require the trial court to invoke
its contempt sanction when a witness refuses to testify. Presumably,
the only legally valid excuses would be duly recognized privileges or
physical inability.
Had the issue been presented as a defense to a contempt cita-
tion and had a showing of real danger been made, the court's ap-
proach might have been entirely different. The result announced in
Jones may have been directed solely to trial judges who may be too
quick to excuse defense witnesses on the basis of mere claims of
fear for personal safety. Should such unsupported claims become
"legally valid" excuses to refuse to testify, both the prosecution and
the defense would suffer.
The supreme court has clearly placed the burden on the trial
court to invoke or threaten to invoke the contempt sanction. It has
not attempted to delineate the nature of any required penalty or
any possible defenses available to the contemner. The court
predicated its position on the broad proposition that the trial court
must do all that is within its power to compel a defense witness to
testify even if the witness can show real grounds to fear for his
safety.
Somewhat reluctantly, the writer must agree with the supreme
court's conclusion. Although a "necessity" defense to contempt may
have superficial appeal, courts simply cannot allow unlawful threats
or fears of unlawful reprisal to defeat their efforts to obtain un-
privileged information from witnesses.
TRIAL IN PRISON CLOTHES-HARMLESS ERROR
During the last term, the supreme court dealt with two cases
from Orleans Parish in which the defendants in custody were
brought to trial in prison jumpsuits. In both cases, the defense ob-
jection was raised prior to examination of prospective jurors.
In State v. Leggett51 the supreme court expressed disapproval of
the practice52 but did not reverse the conviction. Utilizing a
"harmless error" approach, the court noted that the evidence
against the accused was overwhelming. Six months later, however,
in State v. Brown,5 3 the supreme court reversed a conviction
because the defendant was compelled to wear an orange-yellow
jumpsuit issued by the Orleans Parish prison. Recognizing the rela-
51. 363 So. 2d 434 (La. 1978).
52. The court's disapproval even extended to "attractive" jail clothing not distinc-
tively marked as such. Id. at 438.
53. 368 So. 2d 961 (La. 1979).
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tionship between the right to appear as an "innocent" man (and not
as a "prisoner") and the presumption of innocence, the supreme
court emphasized its inability to gauge the actual impact of prison
attire on jurors. The defendant's request that he be tried in "civilian
clothing" was made well enough in advance of trial clearly to
establish that it was not a dilatory tactic. Rather than relying on
testimony regarding the jury's ability to recognize such garb as
prisonwear, the supreme court reversed, based upon its finding that
the accused has a right to stand trial in clothing of non-prison issue.
The position taken by the supreme court in Brown is certainly
proper. There is little reason to dishonor such a specific and timely
request. In order to require strict adherence to constitutionally dic-
tated principles, sometimes the court must reverse convictions
despite the error's limited impact in the particular case before it.
SCOPE OF VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
In three cases decided during the last term, the supreme court
reversed convictions due to trial judges' limitations on questions
propounded by defense counsel during the voir dire examination.
In State v. Hayes," a distribution of heroin case, the defense
counsel was not permitted to ask prospective jurors if they wanted
to hear the defendant's side of the story despite the judge's admoni-
tion that they were not to look unfavorably upon the defendant's
failure to testify. In State v. Boen,55 another case of distribution of a
controlled dangerous substance, the defense counsel was not permit-
ted to ask prospective jurors if they had friends or relatives who
were police officers or if they had occasion to talk with police of-
ficers about their work.
In reversing the convictions in each case, the supreme court
stressed that a wide latitude must be afforded to the defense
counsel in order to effect an intelligent exercise of peremptory
challenges. The defense lawyer in Boen sought to probe the prospec-
tive jurors about their personal relationships with police officers;
the defense lawyer in Hayes sought to probe prospective jurors'
feelings about the failure of non-testifying defendants to directly
confront testimony by police narcotics agents.
In the voir dire examination in State v. Dixon, ' the trial judge
restricted the defense counsel to asking prospective jurors if they
heard the questions previously propounded to other prospective
54. 364 So. 2d 923 (La. 1978).
55. 362 So. 2d 519 (La. 1978).
56. 365 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1978).
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jurors and if their answers would be substantially the same. In
reversing, the supreme court emphasized the right to a "full voir
dire"57 to aid in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges
and recognized that the right entails "addressing, hearing and observ-
ing the veniremen directly and as individuals." 8 The truncated ex-
amination required by the trial court did not comport with Louisiana
constitutional standards. The supreme court clearly denounced such
''en masse" questions as depriving counsel of essential insights into
the understanding and attitudes of prospective jurors.
The supreme court, in consistently emphasizing the relationship
between voir dire and peremptory challenges, is strictly enforcing
the Louisiana constitutional guarantee.5 1 If a "full voir dire" should
delay the jury selection process and, hence, the administration of
justice, the problem is one that could be rectified by constitutional
amendment. The writer is not satisfied that the right to a "full voir
dire" is essential to a fair trial. Federal judges are empowered to
restrict the scope and manner of examination to a degree far
greater than that allowed by the Louisiana constitution." Defen-
dants nevertheless receive fair trials in federal court.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Purporting to apply the standard of Swain v. Alabama,1 the
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed two convictions due to the pro-
secutor's use of peremptory challenges to excuse black prospective
jurors."2 The court approached the problem in both cases by finding
that the defense established a prima facie showing of systematic and
extended use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from jury
service. Furthermore, it was found that the state failed to carry its
burden of showing that the state's actions were due to trial related
considerations. In both cases the court found more than a "bare
showing" of a "disproportionate" number of blacks being peremp-
torily excused.
By using the "burden of proof" approach, the court avoided con-
sidering the merits of Justice Dennis's concurrence in State v.
Eames," in which he argued that the Swain standard imposed an
almost impossible burden and concluded that it was not applicable in
57. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
58. 365 So. 2d at 1312.
59. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
60. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 24, with LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
61. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
62. State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751 (La. 1979).
63. 365 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., concurring).
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Louisiana. Justice Dennis maintained that the use of peremptory
challenges based on race was impermissible under article I, section 3
of the Louisiana constitution,' even if for "trial related" considera-
tions. His view is simply that Louisiana district attorneys cannot
practice discrimination by use of peremptory challenges even if
reasonably related to trial considerations. The Louisiana constitu-
tion's absolute bar to "practicing trial-related racial discrimination"
provides a simple straightforward solution to a difficult problem.
The court has apparently twisted the Swain test into something
akin to the Eames concurrence. The writer has always viewed the
Swain test as placing emphasis, wrongly or not, on the prosecutor's
right to exercise trial related peremptory challenges without
judicial supervision. If Louisiana has a different rule due to article I,
section 3 of the Louisiana constitution, reliance on that standard
should be clearly announced.
As a result of his role in the constitutional convention, Justice
Dennis has a special understanding of the history and meaning of
our present constitution. His approach taken in Eames would pro-
bably require the state to explain its use of peremptory challenges
of blacks. This is preferable to the court's present effort to construe
Swain as dictating the result in State v. Washington" and State v.
Brown."
Witherspoon: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE
DEATH PENALTY
In response to Witherspoon v. Illinois,7 Louisiana amended arti-
cle 798 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to comply with the United
States Supreme Court's guidelines for excusing jurors with "con-
scientious scruples" against the death penalty."
64. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affilia-
tions. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against
a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or
affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter
case as punishment for crime.
65. 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
66. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
67. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
68. 1968 La. Acts, Ex. Sess. No., 13, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 798. This ar-
ticle provides:
It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state, but not on the part of
the defendant, that:
(1) The juror is biased against the enforcement of the statute charged to
have been violated, or is of the fixed opinion that the statute is invalid or un-
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Following Furman v. Georgia" the Louisiana Supreme Court
continued to treat capital cases as "capital" for procedural purposes,
such as the denial of bail, unanimity of verdict, sequestration of
jurors, and joinder, despite the fact that defendants were not
exposed to the risk of death."0 In State v. Willis71 the defendant was
charged with aggravated rape at a time when the offense was
statutorily punishable by death. However, in Selman v. Louisiana,"
decided prior to the trial in Willis, the United States Supreme Court
declared the Louisiana death penalty in cases of aggravated rape un-
constitutional in light of Furman.
The issue presented in Willis, a case in which the death penalty
was judicially reprobated prior to trial, was whether the trial judge
erred in permitting the state to challenge jurors for cause due to
their attitudes toward capital punishment. The court held that per-
mitting such challenges for cause had the effect of granting the
state more peremptory challenges than it was entitled to and
reversed the conviction.
The result reached by the supreme court is correct. However,
the court should reevaluate its position as to the noncapital nature
of procedures applicable in all cases in which the death penalty is
not applicable due to judicial action.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY- UNAUTHORIZED MISTRIALS
In State v. Simpson" the supreme court logically and correctly
applied Louisiana's double jeopardy provisions to produce an unfor-
tunate result. During the defendant's first trial for armed robbery, a
state witness was asked on cross-examination by the defense
counsel about offenses for which he had not been convicted. The
trial court improperly ordered a mistrial on the basis that the jury
constitutional;
(2) The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples
against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it unmistakably clear (a)
that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before him, or (b) that his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him
from making an impartial decisibn as to the defendant's guilt; or
(3) The juror would not convict upon circumstantial evidence.
69. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
70. See State v. McZeal, 352 So.2d 592 (La. 1977); State v. Lott, 325 So. 2d 576
(La. 1976); State v. Flood, 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972); State v. Holmes, 263 La.
685, 269 So. 2d 207 (1972).
71. 364 So. 2d 961 (La. 1978).
72. 428 U.S. 906 (1976).
73. 371 So. 2d 733 (La. 1979).
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may have an "unfavorable impression" of the witness due to the
defense counsel's improper questions.
The defendant asserted that trying him a second time-which
resulted in his conviction for simple robbery -constituted double
jeopardy. Because the mistrial was not legally granted, jeopardy at-
tached and barred further proceedings.
Canvassing the grounds for mistrials, the supreme court
properly found none to justify the trial court's action. Even though
the state is substantially prejudiced by improper defense cross-
examination of a witness, a mistrial is not an available remedy
under Louisiana law unless the defendant consents to the mistrial.
The trial court's only option was to sustain the state's objection and
to give a curative instruction.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY -"PARTIAL DIRECTED VERDICTS"
The supreme court held in State ex rel. Robinson v. Blackburn'
that double jeopardy barred the defendant's conviction of second
degree murder following the trial court's granting of a directed ver-
dict as to first degree murder, the offense charged in the indict-
ment.
Following the close of the state's case, the defendant had moved
for a directed verdict on the basis that the state failed to prove an
essential element of first degree murder. The trial judge agreed, find-
ing that the state's evidence only proved second degree murder, and
granted a "partial directed verdict." The defendant then pled guilty
to second degree murder. In a collateral proceeding, the supreme
court set the conviction aside. The court found that the defendant's
guilty plea did not bar his plea of double jeopardy because prior
jeopardy is a "jurisdictional defect" not waived by a guilty plea.
In Blackburn the supreme court also announced that Louisiana
law did not authorize the trial court to grant a partial directed ver-
dict in those situations in which the court finds that the evidence
will not support the offense charged but will suppport conviction for
a lesser offense. Thus, the directed verdict was treated as an acquit-
tal on the offense charged as well as of all lesser offenses.
There is no reason, however, why a total acquittal should follow
from the state's failure to prove the offense charged if the evidence
properly supports a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense. It
is therefore submitted that the legislature should reinstitute the
directed verdict and provide the judge with the authority to direct a
74. 367 So. 2d 360 (La. 1979).
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verdict only as to the offense charged. The jury should then be per-
mitted to consider the question of guilt or innocence only on lesser
included responsive verdicts.
RECUSATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
In the conduct of proceedings before them, trial courts must pro-
vide the "appearance of justice." When an ad hoc judge, whose law
partner is the legal representative of the local sheriff, sits in a
resisting-arrest case involving a sheriff's deputy, the appearance of
justice suffers despite the sincerest efforts of the judge to decide
fairly.
In State v. LeBlanc"5 the defendant's counsel first learned of the
ad hoc judge's relationship to the sheriffs office after his client's
conviction. In analyzing the grounds for recusal, the supreme court
found that the "catchall provision"" of article 671 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was applicable in situations where "the ap-
pearance of partiality" might be created. Furthermore, the defen-
dant was allowed to raise the issue even though the Code requires
that motions to recuse be raised prior to verdict.77 The supreme
court held that the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself on
his own motion. The court deftly side-stepped a procedural bar, i.e.,
the timeliness of the raising of the issue, in order to announce its
firm disapproval of the trial judge's failure to recognize an obliga-
tion not to sit on the defendant's case.
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
The Louisiana constitution guarantees that a person will not be
deprived of liberty or property without "the right of judicial review
based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judg-
ment is based.""8 The right to review presumably includes the right
to apply for supervisory writs in a non-appealable criminal case.
In proposing revisions to the Code of Criminal Procedure to re-
spond to changes dictated by the 1974 constitution, the Louisiana
State Law Institute has recommended that a record of the pro-
ceedings be made in all felony cases whether requested or not. The
75. 367 So. 2d 335 (La. 1979).
76. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 671(6), comments.
77. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 674.
78. LA. CONST. art. I, § 19. This section provides:
No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or pro-
perty without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all
evidence upon which the judgment is based. This right may be intelligently waived.
The cost of transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.
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Institute did not recommend that a record be kept in misdemeanor
cases absent a request by the defendant, because in many of these
cases no review may even be contemplated. Thus, the legislature
placed upon the defendant the relatively simple burden of re-
questing that misdemeanor proceedings be recorded in order to
assure adequate review in the event of an unfavorable verdict.
In LeBlanc," a misdemeanor case, the supreme court held that
the defendant's failure to ask that a record be made was not a
waiver of his constitutional right of review based on a full record.
The court also held that the legislature cannot condition the exer-
cise of that right upon an advance request that a record be made.
The effect of LeBlanc is to require that all evidence be recorded
in misdemeanor cases unless the defendant specifically waives his
right. The supreme court has properly equated the right to have a
record made with the right to meaningful review. Without a record,
there can be no transcript; without a transcript or some constitu-
tionally adequate alternative, there can be no meaningful review.
TRIAL BY SIX-MEMBER JURY-UNANIMOUS VERDICT
In Burch v. Louisiana0 the United States Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional Louisiana's nonunanimous verdict in six-
member jury cases. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, had no
guidance from the federal court regarding the retroactive applica-
tion of Burch. In State v. Brown8' the court relied on earlier United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to jury trial" and
with unrelated areas in deciding that Burch should not be given
retroactive appliction to cases in which the jury was empaneled
prior to April 17, 1979, the date of the Burch decision.
The writer feels that Brown was correctly decided and hopes
that the lower federal courts will agree with the Louisiana Supreme
Court's approach. The distinction between a nonunanimous twelve-
member jury verdict and a nonunanimous six-member jury verdict
is difficult to articulate. Louisiana's reliance on prior standards was
certainly justified. Prospective application of the new unanimity re-
quirement will suffice, and the accuracy of the fact-finding was not
so sorely affected as to justify retroactive application.
79. See text at notes 75-77, supra.
80. 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979). For a discussion of Burch, see Note, Right to Trial by
Jury: New Guidelines for State Criminal Trial Juries, 40 LA. L. REV. 837 (1980).
81. 371 So. 2d 746 (La. 1979).
82. Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
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In a per curiam opinion in State v. Jackson," the supreme court
had occasion to interpret the impact of Burch regarding the number
of jurors required for acquittal. The court summarily stated, incor-
rectly in the writer's view, that in six-member jury cases, all six
jurors must concur to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty.
In State v. Claiborne8" the trial judge, in advance of the close of
the evidence, advised the prosecution that he intended to instruct
the jury that all six must concur to convict but that only five must
concur to acquit. The trial judge85 properly relied on the Louisiana
constitutional right of the accused to a verdict of acquittal based on
the concurrence of five jurors." As in Jackson, the supreme court
summarily reversed and ordered the trial judge to instruct the jury
that all six must concur to convict or to acquit.
Burch only held that a nonunanimous jury could not convict. It
did not hold, nor could it have held, that the sixth amendment en-
titles the state to any rights regarding the issue of unanimity. The
fact that the draftsmen of the Louisiana constitution may not have
approved such an unbalanced approach-unanimity to convict, but
nonunanimity to acquit-is not the issue. The Louisiana constitution
explicitly provides that only five jurors must concur to acquit.
Resolving the "fairness" of the situation is a matter left not to the
supreme court but rather to the legislature and the voters. It can be
easily argued that if five of six jurors find that the prosecution failed
to produce proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the state
should be barred from reprosecution of the case.
JUROR IMPEACHMENT OF THE VERDICT
In two cases87 decided during the last term, the Louisisana
Supreme Court held that Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:47088 does
not disallow jurors from testifying as to misconduct or activity by
non-jurors which improperly influenced members of the jury.
83. 370 So. 2d 570 (La. 1979).
84. 370 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1979).
85. The trial judge was Hon. P. Raymond Lamonica, Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University, sitting as judge pro tempore filling a vacancy.
86. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
87. State v. Wisham, 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979); State v. Marchand, 362 So. 2d
1090 (La. 1978).
88. LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950) provides:
No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own or his fellows'
misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any indictment or
any verdict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but every juror,
grand or petit, is a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of
the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a member.
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In State v. Marchand89 the jury requested they be permitted to
inspect the defendant's confession. Although the confession was in
evidence, the legislation and jurisprudence clearly disallow such a
document's use by the jury during deliberations."° The trial judge,
after conference with counsel, disallowed the request. The bailiff, in
delivering the message denying the request, informed the foreman
(and another juror) that the defense counsel's objection prevented
the judge from acceding to their request.
The supreme court found no difficulty in determining that such
a communication was improper and prejudicial to the accused. It
was irrelevant that the bailiff's error was inadvertent. The court
held that the trial judge correctly permitted the two jurors to
testify concerning the bailiff's statement to them but not concerning
the effect the statement had on their deliberations. In reversing the
conviction, the supreme court said that evidence of overt acts of
misconduct by third persons was properly the subject of a juror's
testimony.
Following the same theme, the supreme court in State v.
Wisham91 held that two jurors who allegedly viewed the arrest of a
defense witness during a recess of the trial should have been per-
mitted to testify concerning their observations at a motion for a new
trial.
In Wisham, after a defense alibi witness testified, the trial court
ordered a recess. During the recess two of the jurors happened to
enter an adjacent hallway in the courthouse. There they saw
deputies in the process of arresting the defense alibi witness. Dur-
ing cross-examination of the witness, the prosecutor made numerous
references to the crime of perjury.
In his motion for a new trial, the defense counsel alleged that
the jurors would testify not only that they observed the arrest but
also that they told the other jurors and that it was discussed at
length during jury deliberations. The trial judge refused to permit
the defense to offer this evidence, predicating his ruling on Revised
Statutes 15:470.
Remanding for a new hearing on the motion for a new trial, the
supreme court ordered the trial court to hear evidence of the jurors
relative to viewing the arrest and informing the others of its occur-
rence. In a footnote, the court said that the trial judge correctly
89. 362 So. 2d 1090 (La. 1978).
90. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 793. See, e.g., State v. Freetime, 303 So. 2d 487 (La.
1974).
91. 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979).
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prevented testimony concerning the effect of the arrest on the
jurors." The court said that the fact that jurors knew of it was
"presumptively prejudicial" but that the state could offer evidence
to "overcome the presumption."
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:470 only bars evidence to "im-
peach" the jury's verdict. On remand, presumably this statute would
not preclude the jurors from testifying concerning the lack of pre-
judicial effect in an effort to support the verdict. If this is done, it
would surely be unfair to deny to the defendant the opportunity to
elicit from jurors any prejudicial effects which the incident had on
their deliberations.
DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE INFORMATION
In a recent series of cases, the supreme court has made progress
toward disclosure of presentence information to the defendant.
Beginning with the proposition that prejudicial information shown to
be false or misleading must be disclosed-an easy position to
adopt-the court now seems only to require an allegation that the
report contains information which is false or misleading.
In November, 1978, in State v. Boone," the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's failure to afford the defense counsel access
to a presentence report and the opportunity to rebut any un-
favorable information in it. Although the court said that a showing
that the report contained false, prejudical information was required
in order to establish a right to access, the real basis for the decision
seemed to be the defendant's failure to establish his request for ac-
cess. Clearly he must request access.
One month later in State v. Trahan," the supreme court reversed
the trial court's refusal to provide access to the report and the
opportunity to rebut unfavorable material. The defendants, husband
and wife, were convicted of distribution of "PCP," a controlled
dangerous substance. The presentence report, which was sealed and
sent to the supreme court, reported that the husband was the "chief
drug dealer" in the parish and that the wife was "as deeply im-
plicated" as her husband.
Prior to sentencing, the defense counsel moved for access to the
report. He alleged that it contained prejudicially false information
incorrectly picturing the defendants' activities. He requested but
92. Id. at 1154 n.2.
93. 364 So. 2d 978 (La. 1978).
94. 367 So. 2d 752 (La. 1978).
95. Id. at 753.
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was denied an opportunity to controvert the information and to of-
fer explanations for unfavorable hearsay contained in the reports.
In reversing and ordering disclosure and an opportunity to
rebut or explain, the supreme court relied on the defendant's right
to access upon request and "appropriate allegation."" The court's
emphasis in Trahan was upon the "appropriateness" of the allega-
tion and not upon a showing of falsity.
The court's direction is good and should be expanded. The trial
court has the discretion to disclose presentence data. The supreme
court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to require
disclosure, upon request, of all adverse information, whether alleged
to be false or not, absent some showing of good cause to keep such
information from the accused. Otherwise, the defendant may not
know of the existence of false, adverse information and may not be
in a position to allege its falsity.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES
In State v. Burge," decided on September 5, 1978, the supreme
court rejected the defendant's complaint that the bifurcated capital
sentencing trial procedure was improperly employed in a case of ag-
gravated kidnapping. The offense charged was committed prior to
the date of the legislation adopting the bifurcated sentencing pro-
cedure. However, by the time of the defendant's trial, the legislation
was in effect. The sentencing hearing resulted in a jury recommen-
dation directing the trial court to sentence the accused to life im-
prisonment.
Rather than simply rejecting his complaint because he was
sentenced to life, the supreme court chose to discuss the retroactive
application of the capital sentencing procedures. The court, in an
opinion by former Chief Justice Sanders, said that the sentencing
hearing does not increase the severity of the offense but rather
allows the jury to mitigate its severity. Thus, the court found that
the capital sentencing legislation was procedural and hence could be
applied to all proceedings taking place after its effective date
without violating constitutional ex post facto prohibitions.
Several months later, in April, 1979, in State v. Collins," the
supreme court for the first time confronted the situation in which a
death penalty was imposed by a jury following a sentencing hearing
conducted for an offense committed prior to the enactment of the
96. Id. at 754.
97. 362 So. 2d 1371 (La. 1978).
98. 370 So. 2d 533 (La. 1979).
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bifurcated sentencing procedure. In setting aside the death penalty,
the supreme court refused to follow the logic of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Dobbert v. Florida" or its own opinion
in Burge. The court relied on its own assessment of a state
statutory prohibition against retroactive application of new statutes.
The court did not attempt to reach constitutional issues. The
legislature's failure to specify that the procedures should be applied
to proceedings involving crimes committed prior to its date was the
court's basis for finding an intent that the procedures be applied
prospectively only."'
The court's approach in Collins was predictable in light of its
January, 1979, opinion in State v. English.1 ' In English the court
decided not to apply retroactively an amendment to the capital
sentencing procedures allowing the court to grant a new trial on the
question of penalty in the event of error in the sentencing hearing.
At the time of English's crime, if error were committed in the
sentencing hearing, the court was required to set aside the death
penalty and order that a sentence of life be imposed, without the
state being given a second opportunity to seek the death penalty.
The court found that its decision was mandated by "ex post fac-
to principles."'0 2 The court reasoned that the change in the state's
Code of Criminal Procedure which permitted the state to re-try the
sentencing issue exposed the defendant to a more severe penalty
than those existing under the procedures in effect at the time of the
offense.
The writer is not surprised by the court's unwillingness to grant
"procedural" status to capital sentencing procedures. Such changes
can literally be "life or death" matters to the defendant. All efforts
to extend or even to provide constitutionally acceptable procedures
for capital punishment by changes in capital sentencing procedures
will probably meet with similar results. For example, by Act 74 of
1979, the legislature amended article 905.4 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to include new aggravating circumstances justifying the
imposition of the death penalty.' Under Collins and English, these
99. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
100. The writer notes with interest the court's failure to discuss or distinguish
former Chief Justice Sanders' opinion in Burge. The Chief Justice retired before the
court heard the Collins case.
101. 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
102. Id. at 821.
103. Act 74 added the following aggravating circumstances:
(c) the offender . . .has a significant prior history of criminal activity;
(h) the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave
[Vol. 40
1980] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 661
will obviously not be applied in cases of crimes committed prior to
the effective date of Act 74.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE
In State v. Sepulvado"'0 the supreme court finally announced its
willingness to review the trial court's sentences under the "ex-
cessiveness" standard of article I, section 20 of the Louisiana con-
stitution. 1 5 The standards to be applied are those legislatively an-
nounced in the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of article
894.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 6 The court talked in terms
material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defen-
dant, or was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed by the
defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant.
(i) the victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Louisiana
Department of Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment, was re-
quired to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility,
and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.4, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 74. For the ag-
gravating circumstances included in article 905.4 prior to Act 74, see note 31, supra.
104. 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979). For an excellent and detailed analysis of Sepulvado,
see Note, Appellate Review of Sentences: A New Standard in Louisiana, 39 LA. L.
REV. 1172 (1979).
105. LA. CONST. art. I, § 20 provides: "No law shall subject any person to
euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of
citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision follow-
ing conviction for any offense."
106. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1 provides:
A. When a defendant has been convicted of a a felony or misdemeanor, the
court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) The defendant is in need of corectional treatment or a custodial environ-
ment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution;
or
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crime.
B. The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court,
shall be accorded weight in its determination of suspension of sentence or proba-
tion:
(1) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(2) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious harm;
(3) The defendant acted under strong provocation;
(4) There was substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defen-
dant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(5) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its
commission;
(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
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of manifest abuse of discretion and spoke of giving "great weight"10 7
to the "factual characterizations of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances."1 8 Nevertheless, the trial court's sentence is not im-
mune from review for abuse of discretion.
In conjunction with Sepulvado, it is necessary to note the court's
rejection in State v. Cox'" of the contemporaneous objection rule.
Such an objection is not necessary to see that an adequate record is
available for review. A statement of considerations taken into ac-
count and the factual basis for imposing sentence must be given in
order to comply with article 894.1. Neither is the contemporaneous
objection rule required to put the trial court on notice that the
defendant objects. Trial courts may assume that defendants will
complain on appeal regarding the sentence. However, hopefully, if a
sentence is specified as part of a plea bargain, the court will not con-
sider complaints if the plea bargain was intelligently and knowingly
entered into by the accused.
The writer also notes that in the cases following Sepulvado, the
supreme court merely remanded to the trial court to resentence." °
Although rather specific instructions as to how to sentence the
defendant were given to the trial court in Sepulvado, this approach
will apparently only be taken in rare cases. Presumably, the
supreme court will not generally undertake to "resentence" the
defendant but will remand the case to the trial court with guidelines
to consider.
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or
has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of
the instant crime;
(8) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely
to recur;
(9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime;
(10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to proba-
tionary treatment; and
(11) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to
himself or his dependents.
C. The court shall state for the record the considerations taken into account
and the factual basis therefor in imposing the sentence.
107. 367 So. 2d at 767.
108. Id.
109. 369 So. 2d 118 (La. 1979).
110. State v. Watson, 372 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1979); State v. Jacobs, 371 So. 2d 727
(La. 1979); State v. Gist, 369 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1979); State v. Terriault, 369 So. 2d 125
(La. 1979); State v. Cox; 369 So. 2d 118 (La. 1979).
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APPELLATE REVIEW-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE IN
DELINQUENCY CASES
In In re Baptiste' the supreme court, in reviewing the sufficiency
of evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency, clearly stated
that it was not bound by the "total lack of evidence" standard. Since
the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases "ex-
tends to both law and facts,. 1 2 the court logically treated review of
delinquency adjudications under its civil, rather than criminal,
jurisdiction. This interpretation seems in accordance with the other
treatment of appellate jurisdiction regarding delinquency cases. The
appeal in such cases is to the court of appeal rather than the
supreme court as in criminal cases."3
The supreme court in Baptiste dismissed the case on a finding
that the state's evidence was insufficient to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The writer is not convinced that the result would
have been different under the circumstances presented even with a
proper application of the "question of law" standard, i e., whether
the evidence was so lacking that no reasonable man could fail to
entertain .a reasonable doubt. Since the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia,"' this standard is also the
test to be applied in adult criminal cases. The test enunciated in
Jackson is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable judge or juror could
have found the defendant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under the Jackson rationale, the reviewing court must deter-
mine "whether the record could reasonably support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable'doubt."' ' 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court's adoption of the civil standard of
review of facts in delinquency cases is logical. The court is clearly
required to review the legal sufficiency of evidence to support ad-
judications of delinquency.
APPELLATE REVIEW-CREATION OF "JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL" IN
JURY CASES
In two cases decided on October 9, 1978, the supreme court finally
responded to a crucial problem created by the legislative abolition of
the directed verdict in jury trials. The court earlier recognized the
111. 359 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1978).
112. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
113. LA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
114. 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). The Louisiana Supreme Court applied Jackson in State
v. Matthews, No. 64,079 (La. Sept. 4, 1979).
115. 99 S. Ct. at 2789.
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need to reverse convictions in cases in which there was a "total lack
of evidence." Without the directed verdict, the issue of lack of legally
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction must be raised by a mo-
tion for a new trial. Although the defendant's only option was to
move for a new trial, he really sought an acquittal, not an opportunity
to permit the state to re-try him and to supply additional evidence.
In State v. Thompson"' and State v. Liggett,"7 the supreme
court, in opinions authored by Justice Marcus, held that the double
jeopardy protection of the fifth amendment prohibits the state from
having such a second chance. If the state's evidence is insufficient to
sustain the conviction, the defendant is entitled to a judgment of ac-
quittal, not merely a new trial. Thus, in effect, the court has judicially
adopted a procedure by which the defendant, after conviction,
moves for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.
Several months later, the court was confronted with a different
dimension of the problem. In State v. Hudson"' the trial judge
granted a new trial after the jury convicted the defendant of first
degree murder. In granting the new trial, the trial judge indicated
his dissatisfaction with the strength of the state's evidence.
The state brought the case to trial a second time and presented
additional evidence. The jury again convicted the defendant. In a
post-trial application for relief, the defendant contended that the
second trial was barred by double jeopardy.
The supreme court recognized a distinction between the trial
judge's granting a new trial because he is not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt and the trial judge's granting a new trial because
he finds that the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of
law. The trial judge may, in a motion for a new trial, sit as a "thir-
teenth juror" and grant a new trial because he was not convicted by
the state's evidence beyond a reasonable doubt."9 However, if he
finds the evidence so lacking that a reasonable juror must have
entertained a reasonable doubt, then the trial judge must grant a
judgment of acquittal.2"
Confusion has arisen due to the failure of the supreme court to
announce a judicially created device to solve the dilemma presented
by the legislature's abolition of the directed verdict. The trial court
must learn to distinguish clearly between the motion for a new trial
and the judicially created motion for acquittal.
116. 366 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1978).
117. 363 So. 2d 1184 (La. 1978).
118. 373 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1979).
119. See State v. Jones, 288 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973).
120. See State v. Matthews, No. 64,079 (La. Sept. 4, 1979).
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PROBATION REVOCATION-ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
In State v. Lassai'l the supreme court dealt with the ad-
missibility of documentary hearsay at a probation revocation hear-
ing. Over a defense objection, a urinalysis report was offered to
prove that the defendant was illegally using drugs while residing at
a narcotics rehabilitation center. The court said the admission of the
report "violated minimum due process rights of confrontation."
However, because there was other evidence of drug use, the court
said the error was not reversible.
12
The supreme court again confronted the question of documen-
tary hearsay at revocation hearings in State v. Harris.23 The trial
court had permitted the district attorney to offer into evidence a
police arrest report containing information regarding the commis-
sion of a robbery by the probationer. The report's contents were
considered insofar as they tended to prove that the probationer
engaged in criminal conduct.
The supreme court found that the trial court had erred in basing
its judgment to revoke solely on documentary evidence. The court
said the hearsay documentary evidence presented insufficient proof
of the criminal activity which was the basis for revocation. Never-
theless, the court recognized that under some circumstances it is ap-
propriate to use documentary evidence in lieu of live testimony at a
probation revocation hearing. In a footnote to Harris, it was made
clear that, absent good cause for not allowing confrontation, the trial
court should not permit such documentary evidence to substitute for
live testimony.
The court's approach in Harris is far more sophisticated than
that in Lassai. Possibly the court will approve the sufficiency of
revocations based on reliable, although normally inadmissible, hear-
say if a sufficient showing of a good cause is made to excuse its use.
The court had indicated that an appropriate balance must be struck
between the need for reliable evidence at revocation hearings and
the need to prevent revocation hearings from assuming all of the at-
tributes of criminal trials. By placing the emphasis on the "insuffi-
ciency" of hearsay and on the need for "good cause," the court has
clearly recognized the defendant's right to a reliable fact-finding
process at revocation hearings but has avoided adopting a view that
all of the evidentiary rules associated with criminal trials must be
followed.
121. 366 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1978).
122. The court did, however, reverse the revocation on other grounds. See text at
note 124, infra.
123. 368 So. 2d 1066 (La. 1979).
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REVOCATION OF PROBATION-DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS
The supreme court in Lassai evinced a willingness to review the
appropriateness of the trial court's decision to revoke probation.
Lassai, an addict, was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment
for theft and receiving stolen property. His sentence was suspended
on the condition that he reside at a narcotics rehabilitation center.
Urine tests were administered on a daily basis to all residents of
the center. After a test indicated the presence of narcotics, Lassai
admitted drug use to his probation officer; the officer recommended
revocation of probation. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered
the defendant to serve his twenty-five year sentence.
On writ of review, the supreme court found that the trial judge
had abused his discretion by revoking probation. Despite the defen-
dant's violation, the court said that the record did not support the
decision to revoke. The court noted testimony by the staff of the
narcotics rehabilitation center that more time was needed to work
with the defendant and that they still considered him a good can-
didate for rehabilitation.
The writer does not disagree with the reversal of the trial
court's decision to revoke. Although the supreme court seems to
adopt a test of "arbitrary and capricious revocation""' for review of
trial courts' judgments, the revocation in the present case was
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court nevertheless has a duty
to exercise supervisory jurisdiction to set aside revocation of proba-
tion where it finds an abuse of discretion. The implication that the
court will only set aside "capricious" or "arbitrary" revocations is
misleading.
PROBATION -EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF PROBATION
The supreme court held in State v. Guillory'" that once the
period of probation is specified at sentencing, it cannot be extended
even if the reason for the extension is a violation of the terms of
probation.
Guillory was placed on probation after being convicted of
burglary and theft. The period of probation was fixed at two years.
Approximately one month prior to the end of his probationary
period, the defendant came before the court charged with violating the
terms of probation; he admitted the violations. Rather than revoking
the defendant's probation, the trial court extended it for an addi-
tional two years. Sometime later, during the extended period, the
124. 366 So. 2d at 1391.
125. 363 So. 2d 511 (La. 1978).
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defendant was again charged with violating his probationary terms.
Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and made
his sentence of imprisonment at hard labor executory.
Since the second violation occurred after the initial two-year
period had lapsed, the defendant contended that his probation had
expired and could not be revoked. The supreme court agreed, find-
ing that the Code of Criminal Procedure required a specified period
of probation which could not be extended. The court found that the
legislature did not authorize the trial court to extend, in lieu of
revocation, a violation of probation.
Although the writer agrees with the supreme court's analysis,
the trial court's response to the situation presented was both
reasonable and preferable. Revocation, a mere reprimand, or even
intensified supervision when only one month remained were really
not satisfactory alternatives. The probationer's conduct clearly in-
dicated a need for an extended period of supervision. In 1979, the
legislature agreed with the trial court's response and, presumably in
light of Guillory, amended article 900 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure"'6 to permit trial courts to extend probationary periods in
lieu of revocation.
PROBATION REVOCATION- "MIRANDA" WARNINGS
In State v. Lassai"7 the supreme court rejected the contention
that a probationer's statement to his probation officer admitting a
violation of a term of probation could not be received in evidence at
a probation revocation hearing unless "Miranda" warnings preceded
the statement. The statement was an admission by the probationer
that he used drugs in violation of his probation. It was made to the
probation officer in a narcotics rehabilitation center in which the
probationer was residing; no warnings preceded the statement. The
probationer, however, did not claim that the statement was involun-
tary.
126. 1979 La. Acts, No. 90, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 900. This article pro-
vides in pertinent part:
After an arrest or service of a summons pursuant to article 899, the court
shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a
hearing. The hearing may be informal or summary. If the court decides that the
defendant has violated, or was about to violate, a condition of his probation it
may:
(5) Extend the period of probation provided the total amount of time served
by the defendant on probation for any one offense shall not exceed the maximum
period of probation provided by law.
127. 366 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1978).
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The supreme court rejected the defendant's contention without
extended discussion, '28 relying on the decision of the Untited States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Johnson."9
Johnson upheld the use of such statements to prove grounds for
revocation despite the lack of Miranda warnings. 30
In his concurring opinion, Justice Dennis expressed the view
that the application of article I, section 13 of the Louisiana constitu-
tion to this situation may produce a different result. 3' Presumably
the majority did not feel that this constitutional provision would dic-
tate a contrary result. It is unfortunate, however, that the court
chose not to discuss this important issue in some degree of detail.
From reading the court's opinion, probation officers and police of-
ficers are entitled to believe that they are permitted, without prior
warnings, to direct questions to probationers in custody designed to
elicit responses to be used as proof of probation violations.
The writer does not disagree with what appears to be the
court's conclusion that, in probation revocation hearings, only the
free and voluntary standard should be applicable to test the ad-
missibility of statements to probation officers. However, due to the
inadequate analysis offered by the court, the Lassai holding could
imply that the same standard applies to statements secured through
custodial police interrogation designed to elicit admissions for use in
revocation hearings. Possibily the same result would follow.
Nonetheless, the court should have thoroughly analyzed the issues
prior to a pronouncement in dicta that "the Miranda rule has not
been extended to probation hearings."'3 2
EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS OF ARREST
In a series of decisions over the past several years, the supreme
128. The court was not required to reach the issue because it found that the
revocation was an abuse of discretion despite the proof of violation. See text at note
124, supra.
129. 455 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972).
130. The fifth circuit per curiam opinion in Johnson is similarly brief. There a pro-
bationer admitted the purchase and attempted sale of untaxed whiskey to his proba-
tion officer. No Miranda warnings preceded the interview. Rejecting the defense con-
tention, the court said:
A probation revocation hearing is not an adversary or criminal proceeding ...
but is more in the nature of an administrative hearing intimately involved with
the probationer's rehabilitation. An injection of the Miranda protection here could
be toxic and produce a paresis in the probation process.
Id. at 933 (citations omitted). The court also noted the failure of the probationer to
deny the admission or to attack its voluntariness.
131. 366 So. 2d at 1391 (Dennis, J., concurring).
132. 366 So. 2d at 1390.
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court has intelligently interpreted Louisiana's limited provisions
dealing with destruction of records of arrest in misdemeanor cases.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 44:9, a person may move for the
destruction of his record of arrests for misdemeanor violations in
cases in which no conviction was obtained. Finding the purpose of
the statute to be "remedial rather than penal," the court in State v.
Boniface'3 liberally construed the statute to include destruction of
records of arrest for offenses such as first offense possession of
marijuana, no longer classified as a felony, even though the offense
was classified as a felony at the time of the defendant's arrest.
This is an eminently reasonable position. In view of the remedial
purpose of the expungement statute, the later legislative judgment
that a particular conduct is not felonious clearly evidences the
legislative intent to include such tranformed felonies within the
statute's scope. As emphasized by the court, it serves "no justifiable
end"'114 to refuse to apply the legislative benefit of destruction of ar-
rest records in cases not resulting in conviction merely because the
offense was previously classified as a felony.
133. 369 So. 2d 115 (La. 1979).
134. Id. at 117.
